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RETHINKING GEOPOLITICAL AMBITION: 
AN ANALYSIS OF INDIA AND ITS ROLE IN THE 
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
JULIE GEORGE 
ABSTRACT 
Soft power is a significant aspect of India’s identity in the international 
community. Moreover, India has committed itself in being a cooperative, active member 
of the international community. In an alternative theory of power within the field of 
international relations, I argue that while soft power reasons that states are not only 
shaped by threats, bribes, persuasion, and co-optation, but also by norms. Strikingly, 
India was pushed by the United States and the Soviet Union to join the Security Council 
in 1950 and 1955 respectively as a permanent seat member. However, India refused these 
offers and instead, supported the People’s Republic China for the position. Since the 
early 1990s, India has actively pursued permanent membership to the Security Council 
and various reforms by convincing other countries to support its bid. Thus, in the case of 
India and its quest for permanent membership in the Security Council, an alternative way 
of thinking about soft power is the ability to serve as an effective player in international 
politics and influencing other countries’ long-standing positions and preferences on this 
matter. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Many of the international institutions established at the end of World War II have 
sought to alleviate issues such as colonization, the end of the Cold War, environmental 
threats, and global poverty. However, very little has been altered in the basic structure of 
these global institutions. In this paper, I analyze India’s stance on global institutional 
reform, specifically with the United Nations Security Council as India seeks a Permanent 
Seat, from the period of the 1950s to present day. I specifically examine several 
manuscripts and correspondence among prominent Indian political leaders from the 
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library that highlight India’s perspective of the Security 
Council in the mid twentieth century.  
The composition of the United Nations Security Council has been a point of 
contention for several decades; in 1992, the General Assembly created the “Open-Ended 
Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the 
Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council”1. 
Countries such as Japan, Germany, Brazil, and India hope to reform the United Nations 
Security Council in terms of expanded membership and allocating more Permanent Seats 
that are representative of various regions. Other Member States advocate the need for 
greater transparency and attention for the working methods of the council. In fact, former 
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that the relevance of the Security 
Council would dwindle “if we don’t change the council” and that it “risks a situation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Security Council Reform”, United Nations Security Council,  
http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/faq.shtml#process 
2 Harriet Grant. UN Security Council Must Be Revamped Or Risk Irrelevance, Kofi Annan Warns, 
The Guardian, September 23, 2015 
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where the primacy of the council may be challenged by some of the new emerging 
countries”2. As a longstanding proponent of significant reform to the Security Council, 
India emphasizes the urgency of change by lobbying for a permanent seat as evidenced in 
the past several years.  
A plausible explanation for India’s desire to be a permanent member of the 
United Nations Security Council could be the propelling of soft power on the 
international stage through the shaping of norms. Typically, the concept of power is seen 
through superior military capabilities, territorial conquests, and technology. Yet, power 
can also be demonstrated through three forms of soft power: threats, bribes, or co-
options. In Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, Joseph S. Nye Jr. 
explicates the term, “soft power”, which is getting a country to “want what it wants” in 
contrast with hard power, or “ordering others to do what it wants”3. Nye further defines 
soft power as the ability to shape the preferences of states through appeal and attraction, 
or coercion, without the use of force4. Nye argues that soft co-optive power is just as 
important as hard power as it has the ability to set the political agenda, determine the 
framework of debate in a way that shapes others’ performances, and affect what other 
countries want. Several trends today are making soft power and co-optive behavior 
relatively more important. In Jan Melissen’s Wielding Soft Power: The New Public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Harriet Grant. UN Security Council Must Be Revamped Or Risk Irrelevance, Kofi Annan Warns, 
The Guardian, September 23, 2015 
3 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, 1990, Print. pp. 
166 
4 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Public Affairs: New 
York. Print. 
2004, pp. 5 
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Diplomacy, diplomacy is one of soft power’s key instruments. Soft power also includes 
more coercive economic and diplomatic levers, such as participation in multilateral 
organizations. As Peter J. Katzenstein asserts, “changes in norms create only permissive 
conditions for changes in international political behavior”5. In an alternative theory of 
power within the field of international relations, I argue that while soft power reasons that 
individuals are not only shaped by threats, bribes, persuasion, and co-optation, but also 
by norms. Thus, in the case of India and its quest for permanent membership in the 
Security Council, an alternative way of thinking about soft power is the ability to serve as 
an effective player in international politics and influencing other countries’ long-standing 
positions and preferences. 
THE PREDECESSOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
 To fully understand the United Nations Security Council and its foundation, one 
should compare it to the League of Nations. The League of Nations was a pioneer in the 
international system in that it advanced the goals of international security. However, it 
also possessed several weaknesses that the United Nations sought to overcome.  In The 
United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 
1945, the authors write “the League Covenant provided for a Council which can in some 
ways be seen as a precursor to the UN Security Council; but the arrangements for it 
proved to be ineffectual”6. The League Council’s membership raises three concerns.  The 
Council did not have all major powers of the time, evidenced by the absence of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. 
Columbia University Press. New York. Print. 1996, pp. 185 
6 Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, The United Nations 
Security Council and War, Oxford University Press, 2008, Print. pg. 10 
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United States, Germany being a member only from 1926 to 1933, and Japan leaving the 
body in 1933 and Italy in 1937. The only two countries that remained in the League 
Council were Britain and France. The last concern of the League Council was that all 
members had the right to veto power, irrespective if they were permanent or non-
permanent members. As the number of participants in the League Council increased, so 
did the number of vetoes, which resulted in an increase of tension within the body.  
 Moreover, the League Council was vague in its management of international 
security as evidenced by Article 10 of the Covenant. For example, the Covenant does not 
go into specifics of what constitutes “aggression”. This is problematic in that issues such 
as violations of treaty regimes or human rights can threaten peace, but not be identified as 
“aggression” based on the Covenant. Article 10 of the Covenant reads:  
The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against 
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political 
independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such 
aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the 
Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be 
fulfilled7. 
This article is notably weak in its delineation of threats to international peace, as it does 
not expound on how the Council would advise and resolve the dispute. In this flawed 
text, the League Council only enforces economic sanctions if a state defies the principles 
of the Covenant. Military action, written vaguely in the text, is recommended, but not 
mandatory as evident in Article 16(2): “It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, The United Nations 
Security Council and War, Oxford University Press, 2008, Print. pg. 65 
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recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air 
force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used 
to protect the covenants of the League”8. The League Council also did not explicitly state 
how it would go about disarmament, but rather expresses the goal of decreasing 
armaments across nations. Article 8 states “The Members of the League recognize that 
the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point 
consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international 
obligations”9. Overall, the League Council had a myriad of ambitious objectives that 
inspired the establishment of the United Nations Security Council, but ultimately failed 
due to its vagueness and weaknesses.   
After seeing the failure of the League of Nations, the founders of the United 
Nations composed a charter that would pledge that the major powers would join and 
remain in the organization. One of the biggest differences between the League Council 
and the United Nations Security Council derives from veto power. The United Nations 
Security Council deviated from the League Council’s veto power distribution by 
restricting the right to only permanent members. Additionally, the United Nations 
Security Council extended the range of international security issues it would address in 
comparison to its predecessor. While the League Council utilized economic sanctions 
principally, the United Nations Security Council had established that it could potentially 
use force first without the use of economic sanctions. Furthermore, the United Nations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, The United Nations 
Security Council and War, Oxford University Press, 2008, Print. pg. 11 
9 Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, The United Nations 
Security Council and War, Oxford University Press, 2008, Print. pg. 12 
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Security Council deviated from the League Council in that it would not recommend 
military action to nations, but rather take military measures in its own right10. Essentially, 
the United Nations Security Council was specific in its efforts of promoting international 
security through a deliberate, comprehensive United Nations Charter – a contrast to the 
League Council’s ambiguous Covenant.  
HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
 Ratified by the victors of World War II, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Republic of China [Taiwan] on 
October 24, 1945, the United Nations Charter established the United Nations Security 
Council, which also appointed the five aforementioned countries as permanent members 
to the body. At this time, there were six non-permanent members, rotating every two 
years and distributed on a fair geographic basis. In 1965, the number of non-permanent 
members increased to ten, with five from Africa and Asia, one from Eastern Europe, two 
from Latin America and the Caribbean, and two from Western Europe.  
The members of the United Nations Security Council met on January 17, 1946 in 
London for the first time as a body to discuss the elimination of weapons of mass 
destruction11. As Jonas von Freiesleben relates in “Reform of the Security Council”, the 
Security Council “had turned into a political battleground between the East and West, 
serving mainly as a highly publicized forum where appeals for justice could be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, The United Nations 
Security Council and War, Oxford University Press, 2008, Print. pg. 229 
11 “The UN Security Council”, United Nations Foundation, http://www.unfoundation.org/what-
we-do/issues/united-nations/the-un-security-council.html 
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proclaimed, antagonists demonized, and the virtue of one’s own cause declared”12. 
However, the number of Member Nations increased in the United Nations during the 
1950s and 1960s, particularly from Africa and Asia. Thus, with the increase of 
membership came efforts to change the composition of the Security Council, which were 
rejected by the United States, United Kingdom, Republic of China, France, and the 
Soviet Union. Despite the resistance of the permanent Security Council members, the 
calls for reform were too loud to ignore. 
 There have been minimal changes to the United Nations Security Council since its 
inception. In 1965, an amendment was added to the UN Charter that called for an 
increase in membership to 15 for the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 1991 
A (XVIII). In 1971, the Republic of China [Taiwan] was replaced on the Security 
Council by the People’s Republic of China. In 1991, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
Russian Federation assumed the permanent seat in the body. These are the very few 
changes to the Security Council despite many countries recently coming forward and 
wanting a revamping of the body. In 1992, India and 35 other non-aligned countries 
called upon the General Assembly to focus on the item entitled Question of Equitable 
Representation On and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council. India and 
several other countries actually pushed for this item as early as 1979, but the General 
Assembly only placed it on the agenda in 199213.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Jonas von Freiesleben, “Reform of the Security Council”,  
https://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/ManagingChange-1.pdf, pp. 2 
13 Jonas von Freiesleben, “Reform of the Security Council”,  
https://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/ManagingChange-1.pdf, pp. 3 
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Currently, Brazil, Germany, Japan, and India are four of the leading countries that 
aim to make significant changes to the council, such as increasing the membership from 
15 to 25 members. Known as the G-4 countries, Brazil, Germany, Japan, and India have 
recommended expansion of the body, specifically the addition of six permanent Security 
Council seats and four non-permanent members. In 2012, India’s Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations, Hardeep Singh Puri, emphasized that the provision 
on the veto should be retained as well as a discussion on the specific conditions and 
circumstances under which the veto can be utilized by countries. He further elaborated 
that a potential veto restraint agreement could benefit a reformed Security Council14. As 
for the composition of the Security Council, a proposal to reform the body would require 
the approval of two-thirds of the United Nations General Assembly. Ultimately, many 
countries in the General Assembly are in support of an expansion of the United Nations 
Security Council, but there seems to be a lack of consensus on the type of seats or which 
countries should occupy them.  
FUNCTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
 The overwhelming duty of the United Nations Security Council is the 
“responsibility to protect” the international community. This entails collective action to 
protect citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity 
when national authorities fail to do so15. Under the jurisdiction of the United Nations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 PTI,  “UN Security Council Serves No One’s Purpose: India”, The Hindu, November 3, 2012, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/un-security-council-serves-no-ones-purpose-
india/article4061775.ece 
15 Hitoshi Nasu, “The UN Security Council’s Responsibility and the “Responsibility to Protect”, 
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 15, 2011, p. 377-418 
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Charter, the Security Council has the authority to do the following: uphold international 
peace and security in agreement with the principles and purposes of the United Nations; 
examine any dispute or situation which might result in international friction; advise 
methods of adjusting disputes or the terms of settlement; communicate plans for the 
establishment of a system to regulate armaments; resolve the existence of a threat to the 
peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken; request 
Member States to engage in economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use 
of force to prevent or halt aggression; take military action against an aggressor; 
recommend the admission of new members; utilize the trusteeship functions of the United 
Nations in ‘strategic areas’; and propose to the General Assembly the appointment of the 
Secretary General and, together with the Assembly, to select the Judges of the 
International Court of Justice16.  
 Due to the gravity and complexity of the issues that the United Nations Security 
Council handles, it has established a series of subsidiary organs to perform its functions. 
Article 29 of the United Nations Charter gives the United Nations Security Council the 
authority to create these bodies as needed. Some subsidiary organs created by the United 
Nations Security Council are Counter-Terrorism and Non-Proliferation Committees, 
Military Staff Committee, Sanctions Committees, Standing Committees and Ad Hoc 
Bodies. The Counter-Terrorism Committee is responsible for preventing domestic and 
international terrorist acts, criminalizing the financing of terrorism, denying all forms of 
financial support for terrorist groups, and sharing information with other governments on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 “Functions and Powers”, United Nations Security Council,  
http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/functions.shtml 
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any groups practicing or planning terrorist acts17. The Military Staff Committee facilitates 
UN military measures and regulates armaments. The Sanctions Committees is 
responsible for applying pressure on a State or entity to comply with the objectives 
elicited by the Security Council without utilizing the use of force through the use of 
mandatory sanctions. The Security Council administers mandatory sanctions to enforce 
its decisions, especially in cases where peace has been threatened or diplomatic efforts 
have failed. The types of sanctions the body employs are comprehensive economic and 
trade sanctions, arm embargoes, travel bans, financial, and diplomatic restrictions. As for 
the Standing Committees and Ad Hoc Bodies, the Security Council has formed these as 
open-ended to handle specific issues for a limited time18. As one of the six main organs 
of the United Nations, the Security Council aims to maintain international security 
through these subsidiary bodies. 
 Additionally, one of the principal efforts of the United Nations Security Council 
is its Peacekeeping Operations and Political Missions. Peacekeeping operations are 
employed to maintain peace and security through the collaboration of military, police, 
and civilian personnel. These diverse operations facilitate political processes, protect 
civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former 
combatants, promote human rights, restore the rule of law, and support the organization 
of elections. Furthermore, political missions are set forth to stabilize peace-building 
activities such as peace agreements. As an Advisory Subsidiary Body of the Security 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 “Our Mandate”, Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/ 
18  “Standing Committees and Ad Hoc Bodies”, United Nations Security Council, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/structure.shtml 
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Council, the Peacebuilding Commission is responsible for bringing together international 
donors, relevant actors, national governments, and troop contributing countries to arrange 
resources and propose comprehensive strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and 
recovery19. The Security Council has carried out a myriad of peacekeeping operations 
and political missions throughout various regions pursuant to preserving global security.  
INDIA’S PAST STANCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL  
 
 India was one of the 51 original members of the United Nations when it was 
established in 1945. Its first encounter with the United Nations Security Council centered 
on the dispute over Kashmir in 1948, which was instigated by an incursion of tribal 
forces supported by the Pakistani military. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
looked to the Security Council to defuse the tension, but was disappointed. He felt that 
the western powers of the Security Council viewed this issue between two countries, and 
not as an invasion of one’s territory by the other20. Chinmaya R. Gharekhan’s India and 
the United Nations builds on this argument by stating that Indian leaders thought the 
Security Council to be a political body dominated by individual countries’ national 
interests, and not the specifics of the issue at hand21. To this day, the Kashmir dispute 
continues to be a controversial conflict that has resulted in increased tensions between 
India and Pakistan.  
 In its first term on the Security Council in 1950, India stressed that the United 
Nations should resolve the Korean War without intervention. However, the Security 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 “Structure”, United Nations Security Council, http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/structure.shtml 
20 Rohan Mukherjee and David M. Malone, India and the UN Security Council, pp. 110 
21 Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, India and the United Nations, in Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta 
(ed.), Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities, 2007 
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Council ultimately chose to pursue an armed intervention, which India supported only via 
a field ambulance unit. After the Korean War, India took an active role in the repatriation 
of prisoners-of-war and refugees. It continued to support UN efforts through 
humanitarian assistance, military observers, and senior officials in UN operations in west 
Asia, Africa, and Asia. In its second term on the Security Council in 1967, India spoke 
critically of Israeli aggression against the surrounding Arab countries. Furthermore, it 
emphasized a pro-Arab policy by promoting sovereignty and the rights of Arab countries 
at the time. During the second term, India also rejected the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty as it viewed it immoral and unjust towards the equality of states. Specifically, the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty allows states that have nuclear weapons to retain them 
while other countries are not allowed to possess them. India views this as discriminatory 
as the United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China were the only 
countries that had nuclear weapons at the time and thus, saw this as a monopoly for 
possessing nuclear arms. In its third term on the Security Council in 1972, the body 
primarily focused on decolonization of Africa and issues in west Asia. At the time, India 
continued its strong stance against Israel and remained an active advocate against 
colonialism.  
However, India drew a lot of attention when it conducted its first nuclear test in 
1974 through the “Smiling Buddha” operation. As a result of the nuclear test, many 
countries came together to form the Nuclear Suppliers Group in the hope of strengthening 
nuclear non-proliferation efforts and safeguards. Conversely, India claims that the nuclear 
underground test was conducted for peaceful means as it was seen as research for mining 
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techniques, stimulation of oil reservoirs, and efforts towards nuclear engineering. In fact, 
India created the nuclear device, CIRUS or otherwise known as the Canada-India Reactor 
U.S., which included a 40-megawatt reactor and plutonium from Canada and the United 
States. Many countries did not view this explosion as peaceful and began to stray from 
nuclear technology collaborations with India in the hopes of forestalling India’s future 
nuclear tests. India struggled to make the United Nations’ Member States comprehend 
that it did not export nuclear weapons-related information, technology, or materials 
beyond its borders, but these efforts were unsuccessful. The short-term goal of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group was to contain India’s nuclear arsenal and sever India’s access 
to nuclear material and technology22. As India is not a signatory of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty or a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to this day, it remains 
largely isolated from international trade in nuclear plants or materials.  
India returned to the United Nations Security Council for its fourth term in 1977, 
taking an active role by co-sponsoring various resolutions. For example, it co-sponsored 
resolutions focused on the withdrawal of Israeli military troops from Lebanese territory, 
rebuked South Africa’s actions in Angola’s civil war, and three resolutions that 
denounced the minority white regime in Southern Rhodesia. Identifying as a Third World 
country, India also criticized apartheid in South Africa and the treatment of Indians in 
South Africa. In its fifth term on the Security Council in 1984, India continued its stance 
on South Africa and Israeli actions towards the Palestinians23.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 “The Peaceful Explosion”, AtomicArchive.com, Web,  
http://www.atomicarchive.com/History/coldwar/page17.shtml 
23 Rohan Mukherjee and David M. Malone, India and the UN Security Council, pp. 111 
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India was elected to the Security Council for the sixth time in 1991. At the time, 
India was struggling with coalition politics within its borders and an economic crisis, 
particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It also had conflicting opinions on the 
Iraq-Kuwait situation, as its first reaction was to rebuke the US invasion. However, Delhi 
then supported US efforts and permitted US airplanes to refuel on Indian territory. This 
sparked outrage among the domestic crowd, which led the Indian government to stop US 
airplanes from landing in India for refueling. In terms of voting in the Security Council 
on the issue of Iraq, India ultimately chose to abstain on two vital votes. Additionally, it 
abstained on four resolutions that focused on an arms embargo against Libya, 
contributing humanitarian aid in Bosnia, increasing the UN peacekeeping force in 
Bosnia, and the termination of Yugoslavia’s membership to the United Nations24. To 
several countries, India seemed to lack a handle on these global issues. 
In contrast to the Security Council’s ability, and sometimes inclination, to utilize 
force, India became a protester of human and military intervention in the 1990s. India 
attempted to become a non-permanent member of the Security Council once again in 
1996, but failed. Instead, Japan won the position by a noticeably large margin, with many 
pointing to its financial prowess to gain votes in the General Assembly. In the same year, 
India rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which may have affected the election 
for the non-permanent seat. Two years after the inception of Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, India pursued further nuclear tests, which elicited negative reactions from the 
international community for some time. However, many countries began to notice India 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Rohan Mukherjee and David M. Malone, India and the UN Security Council, pp. 112 
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for its rising power as a result of its fast economic growth and nuclear capabilities. It was 
also in the 1990s that India became more vocal in asserting greater representation in 
international organizations. India pushed for this systemic change based on national 
capabilities, previous contributions to the United Nations, and ability to view issues 
objectively for the common good of the international community. For India, this fostered 
its desire to seek permanent membership in the Security Council. 
INDIA’S CHANCE AT PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP IN 1950 & 1995 
 
 Strikingly, India was pushed by the United States and the Soviet Union to join the 
Security Council in 1950 and 1955 respectively as a permanent seat member. In Anton 
Harder’s “Not at the Cost of China: New Evidence Regarding US Proposals for Joining 
the United Nations Security Council”, it is asserted that the United States wanted to 
further its own Cold War strategy regarding China. In its strategy, the United States 
sought out India to take the permanent seat, which was ultimately declined by Indian 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Many critics of Nehru look to this pivotal point in 
history and rebuke the first prime minister for sacrificing India’s national interests on the 
grounds of morality. However, Harder highlights that for Nehru, “integrating the People’s 
Republic of China into the international community by conceding its right to the Chinese 
seat at the Security Council was in fact a central pillar of Nehru’s foreign policy”25. 
Furthermore, it is not true that Nehru rejected the idea of permanent membership in the 
Security Council for India. Rather, he believed that “India is not anxious to enter the 
Security Council at this stage, even though as a great country she out to be there. The first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Anton Harder, “Not at the Cost of China: India and the United Nations Security Council, 
1950”, Woodrow Wilson International Center, March 2015, pp. 1 
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step to be taken is for China to take her rightful place and then the question of India 
might be considered separately26”.  
Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin also pushed for India to be a permanent member 
of the Security Council in 1955. Nehru did not want to cause tension between India and 
China, and therefore, opposed the Soviet offer as well. The Prime Minister stated the 
following:  
 “Perhaps Nikolai Bulganin knows that some people in USA have 
suggested that India should replace China in the Security Council. This is 
to create trouble between us and China. We are, of course, wholly opposed 
to it. Further, we are opposed to pushing ourselves forward to occupy 
certain positions because that may itself create difficulties and India might 
itself become a subject to controversy. If India is to be admitted to the 
Security Council, it raises the question of the revision of the Charter of the 
UN. We feel that this should not be done till the question of China’s 
admission and possibly of others is first solved. I feel that we should first 
concentrate on getting China admitted. What is Bulganin’s opinion about 
the revision of the Charter? In our opinion this does not seem to be an 
appropriate time for it.27”  
After hearing what Nehru said, Premier Bulganin also supported the idea that it was not 
the appropriate time to add a new permanent member to the council. From these 
exchanges, we learn that Nehru thought the issue of the People’s Republic of China in the 
Security Council and its relations to India took precedence in terms of foreign policy 
decisions.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 AG Noorani, “The Nehruvian Approach;” the quote comes from Selected Works of Jawaharlal 
Nehru, second series, vol. 29, pp. 303 
27 AG Noorani, “The Nehruvian Approach;” the quote comes from Selected Works of Jawaharlal 
Nehru, second series, vol. 29, 231 
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 As for the United States’ offer to India, Nehru and his sister, Ms. Vijaya Lakshmi 
Pandit were in close communication when she visited Washington DC as India’s 
Ambassador to the United States. In a letter to Nehru, Mrs. Pandit explained what was 
taking place in Washington DC:  
“One matter that is being cooked up in the State Department should be 
known to you. This is the unseating of China as a Permanent Member in 
the Security Council and of India being put in her place…I told him [John 
Foster Dulles] our attitude and advised him to go slow in the matter as it 
would not be received with any warmth in India.28”  
The Prime Minister responded to Mrs. Pandit’s letter with the following:  
 
“In your letter you mentioned that the State Department is trying to unseat 
China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council and to put India in 
her place. So far as we are concerned, we are not going to countenance it. 
That would be bad from every point of view. It would be a clear affront to 
China and it would mean some kind of a break between us and China. I 
suppose the state department would not like that, but we have no intention 
of following that course. We shall go on pressing for China’s admission in 
the UN and the Security Council. I suppose that a crisis will come during 
the next sessions of the General Assembly of the UN on this issue. The 
people’s government of China is sending a full delegation there. If they 
fail to get in there will be trouble, which might even result in the USSR 
and some other countries finally quitting the UN. That may please the 
State Department, but it would mean the end of the UN as we have known 
it. That would also mean further drift towards war. India because of many 
factors, is certainly entitled to a permanent seat in the Security Council. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit to Jawaharlal Nehru, 24 August 1950, in Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit Papers 
1st Installment (Pandit I), Subject File No. 59, Subject: 1949-51, Letters to Jawaharlal Nehru from 
VL Pandit sent during her tenure as Indian Ambassador to the United States of America, 132, 
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But we are not going in at the cost of China.29”  
The United States offered a permanent seat to India due to the tensions of the Cold War 
and as move to thwart the People’s Republic of China. For the United States, India was a 
large democratic country that supported non-alignment and could potentially serve the 
United States’ national interests in the Security Council. However, Nehru valued the 
United Nations in its efforts to mitigate tensions. To accept the permanent member seat 
would disrupt international stability and drastically affect the relationship between India 
and China. Nehru communicated to Ms. Pandit the following on the India−China 
relationship: 
“As a realist, one has to recognize that Communists control the greater 
part of China and may, before long, control the whole of that country. In 
broader interest of international peace, it is not desirable that we should do 
anything that would make cultivation of normal friendly relations with the 
new China difficult, if not impossible.30”  
For Nehru, India’s foreign policy aimed to reveal to the world that the People’s Republic 
of China could be a cooperative power in the international community, as well as 
decrease Cold War anxieties. At the same time, Nehru wholly supported the idea that 
India deserved a permanent seat in the Security Council, but timing was an important 
factor.  
 Ultimately, India chose to not take up the Soviet or US offers for a permanent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Jawaharlal Nehru to Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, 30 August, 1950, in Pandit I, Subject File No. 60, 
Subject: 1949, 1950-1951, Letters received by V.L. Pandit as Ambassador to Washington from 
Jawaharlal Nehru concerning India’s relations with US, Pakistan, and other countries and 
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Security Council seat because it valued stability in the international system. Even before 
the US and Soviet offers for permanent membership in the Security Council, India 
respected China and its friendship. Ting His-lin’s “We Welcome the Indian Cultural 
Delegation” speaks of this nature in 1952, writing, “in the world today, the period 
demands that the people of China and India further strengthen their friendship to struggle 
for peace in Asia and in the world. Hence, friendship between China and India is not only 
the desire of the peoples of two big nations, but also the desire of all mankind”31. This 
mentality of friendship and stability reverberated in Nehru’s decision in 1950 and 1955 to 
decline the offers of a Security Council seat.  
INDIA AND CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
  
The Sino-India relationship in the 1950s was a complex one as evidenced by 
Jawaharlal Nehru’s communications with his sister, Shrimati Vijay Lakshmi Pandit.  In a 
letter dated August 30, 1950, Nehru wrote, “There can be little doubt that the Chinese 
Government is trying its best to be friendly to us. Apart from present day conflicts and in 
the long run, I am sure that it is of great importance to Asia and to the world that India 
and China should be friendly.32” Additionally, Nehru made it clear his view of the 
Kuomintang representative in the Security Council. He writes that the Government of 
Formosa is “practically protected by a foreign power, the US”, yet is supposed to be a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ting Hsi-Lin, Translation: “We Welcome the Indian Cultural Delegation”, in Vijaya Lakshmi 
Pandit Papers 2nd Installment (Pandit I), Subject File No. 19, 1952, pg. 150-151, Nehru Memorial 
Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML). 
32 Jawaharlal Nehru to Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, 30 August, 1950, in Pandit I, Subject File No. 60, 
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great power and serve as a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power. 
In another letter addressed to Ms. Pandit on September 12, 1950, Nehru reiterates India’s 
support of the People’s Republic of China taking up the permanent seat at the Security 
Council, “So far as we are concerned, we must go full steam ahead to support it and to 
get others to support it, and should make the USA and other countries appreciate that this 
is a vital matter for us and for the world. I am quite sure that if this is voted down because 
of the USA, the future will be quite dark.33”  
Through these communications between Nehru and Ambassador Pandit, we gain 
a perspective on how India views China and the future of the international system. Nehru 
emphasizes how their “championing China’s cause in the United Nations” went a long 
way in sustaining peace and security. Nehru further elaborates in his letter dated 
September 14, 1950, that he has “no doubt that the friendly influence we [India] have 
exercised on China during the past few months has helped the cause of peace. They 
[China] listen to us, even though they might not agree, because they feel that our advice 
is disinterested34.” Nehru believed that India did have a place in the Security Council as a 
permanent member, but he prioritized how India could sustain stability in the 
international system by placing the People’s Republic of China in the permanent seat.  	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INDIA AND THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE - 1955 
 
 The Bandung Conference, held from April 18–24, 1955, was important to India's 
mentality on its position in the international arena, and subsequently, its United Nations 
policy and aspirations. This was the first large scale conference organized by newly 
independent Asian and African countries such as India, Indonesia, Ceylon, Pakistan, and 
Burma to advocate cultural cooperation, international peace, and opposition to 
colonialism. The fight against colonialism that India had to endure to gain independence 
pushed forth the Non-Alignment Movement. India desired to be the master of its 
fate. Many of the non-aligned countries promoted the principles of self-determination, 
national independence, sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of States. In Nehru’s 
speech to the Bandung Conference Political Committee on the status of global politics, he 
boldly stated to the delegations, “So far as I am concerned, it does not matter what takes 
place; we will not take part in it [blocs] unless we have to defend ourselves. If I join any 
of these big groups I lose my identity.35” Moreover, Pakistan, Philippines, Iraq, and 
especially India, struggled against imperialism, and opposed multilateral military 
alliances, apartheid, and the use of force to solve international issues.  
The Bandung Conference was pioneering in the fact that these smaller, although 
population dense, countries advocated peaceful coexistence among all nations and 
democratization of international relations. In his speech to the Bandung Conference 
participants, Nehru urged countries to be aware of the unaligned area and how joining 
different camps or alliances could lead to war. Unlike many Western countries, the 	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countries that attended the Banding Conference pushed for international cooperation on 
an equal footing36. The Bandung Conference was monumental in international politics 
because it was a milestone for Third World countries to collaborate, discuss their political 
views, and insist that their recommendations play a role in the world order.  
By working alongside African countries, India emphasized the need for a positive 
approach to all issues, particularly because the Afro-Asian group assumed new character 
and power in the international system. Ms. Pandit attended the 18th Session of the 
General Assembly, where she ascertained that there were opportunities available in which 
India could take a prominent role in African and UN affairs with a clearly defined policy. 
India desired to be of assistance to African countries because many nations were divided 
among themselves and without common policies. Ms. Pandit writes, “We had abandoned 
no principles. We continued pledged to the things we believe in. We wanted the closest 
co-operation with the African nations but statesmanship demanded different methods of 
approach to world issues at different times”37. She also convinced African leaders at this 
session that India did not have an ulterior motive of leadership, but rather had the desire 
to collaborate in the United Nations and outside with African and Asian countries in 
establishing a new world order that valued freedom and equality of opportunity for all 
without discrimination. However, Ms. Pandit not only calls for cooperation between 
Asian and African countries, but also the initiative to voice their opinions. She writes, “I 
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stressed the point that, we, the new nations, now had the responsibility of living up to the 
statements we had made in the past. Soon our group would have the majority voice in the 
United Nations and we must use our power to good purpose”38. Through Ms. Pandit’s 
words and encouragement for African and Asian countries, many leaders began to look to 
India for leadership in international cooperation at the United Nations.  
 The principles and spirit of the Non-Alignment Movement continued after the 
Bandung Conference. The major leaders of the Non-Alignment Movement were Gamal 
Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Ahmed 
Sukarno of Indonesia and Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia; they later became the founding 
fathers of the movement.39  Similar to the core of the Bandung Conference, the Non-
Alignment Movement insisted that countries should not be passive in the world system. 
Rather, the movement urged Third World countries to have a voice in international 
politics and take concerted action. Based on India's Ministry of External Affairs, "In 
1960, in the light of the results achieved in Bandung, the creation of the Movement of 
Non-Aligned Countries was given a decisive boost during the Fifteenth Ordinary Session 
of the United Nations General Assembly, during which 17 new African and Asian 
countries were admitted.40” As the Non-Alignment Movement began to grow, so did the 
number of Member States in the United Nations. These non-aligned countries began to 	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take more of a firm stance in international politics, specifically India. Similarly, these 
countries made efforts to raise their voices so that the Great Powers’ voices were not the 
only ones being listened to in the United Nations.  
 However, in 1971, India signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation 
with the Soviet Union, which shocked various countries and bruised India’s reputation. It 
seemed to other countries that India was taking a stance of alignment in international 
affairs, especially when it interfered in the affairs of neighboring countries from the 
1970s to 1980s. A great amount of debate that followed the Banding Conference was 
categorizing Soviet policies in Central Asia and Eastern Europe as the same as Western 
imperialism. Although there was criticism of the signing of this treaty, Indo-Soviet 
relations began to gain momentum after Soviet leaders visited India in 1955. In his 
speech to the Bandung Conference participants on major blocs, Nehru asserted that he 
“belong[s] to neither and [I] propose to belong to neither whatever happens in the world. 
If we have to stand alone, we will stand by ourselves, whatever happens (and India has 
stood alone without any aid against a mighty Empire, the British Empire) and we propose 
to face all consequences…”41. Additionally, he argued that a relationship between 
countries can survive without any trace of bloc politics or alliances. In fact, Nehru stated 
that India does not agree with communist teaching or with anti-communist teachings.  
However, he stated, “We have had their (Soviet leadership) goodwill and their good 
wishes all along…and this is the consolation to use and we certainly hope to have that in 
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the future”42. At the core of the Non-Alignment Movement, countries like India were not 
passive or neutral to global issues, but rather took a stance for their values of cooperation 
and stability, and were willing to cooperate with countries in good faith.   
INDIA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED NATIONS 
 
 India has fostered a close relationship with the United Nations as it shares several 
norms towards peace and security. From being the first country to raise the issue of racial 
discrimination and apartheid in South Africa, to cosponsoring the landmark 1960 
“Declaration on UN on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”, 
India had established itself as a “leading advocate of the concerns and aspirations of 
developing countries and the creation of a more equitable international economic and 
political order”43. According to its Ministry of External Affairs, India’s contemporary 
priorities rest on the idea that it “strongly believes that the United Nations and the norms 
of international relations that it has fostered remain the most efficacious means for 
tackling today’s global challenges. 44 ” Moreover, the Ministry of External Affairs 
emphasizes how India believes in the spirit of multilateralism to accomplish 
comprehensive and equitable solutions to international issues. From its interactions 
within the United Nations both in the past and current day, India has and will continue to 
partner with like-minded countries to sustain peace and security in the world.  
 It is also important to note Pakistan’s attitude towards India in the United Nations 	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as these two countries have a complex relationship. Evidenced by the Security Council’s 
countless struggles to resolve the Kashmir issue in the mid 1950s, India and Pakistan 
have utilized the body as a forum for bargaining and unsuccessful negotiation. This has 
certainly tainted their present day relationship in the United Nation, as Pakistan opposes 
India’s aim for permanent membership in the Security Council. Also of importance, India 
and Pakistan have both served as a non-permanent member to the Security Council seven 
times. As a result, it is critical to understand India and Pakistan’s relationship in the 
United Nations because of the obstacles and anxieties the countries face at a multilateral 
level from a contentious history. India’s diplomatic and political capabilities will be 
tested in international forums such as the United Nations due to Pakistan’s stance towards 
its rival. Therefore, India’s quest for permanent membership in the Security Council 
requires widespread support from numerous Member States, but must also tackle 
Pakistan’s full-fledged opposition.  
INDIA’S PRESENT DAY ROLE - UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL 
 
 After a near two decades of hiatus, India became a non-permanent member of the 
Security Council in 2011. So far, India has served as a non-permanent member of the 
United Nations Security Council in the following years: 1950–1951, 1967–1968, 1972–
1973, 1977–1978, 1984–1985, 1991–1992, and 2011–201245. In its seventh two-year 
term, 2011–2012, India joined the Security Council with many people observing its 
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tenure as a “rehearsal for permanent membership”46. Rohan Mukherjee and David M. 
Malone’s India and the UN Security Council: An Ambiguous Tale emphasizes New 
Delhi’s top priorities for expanding permanent membership of the body through five 
main goals. The five goals for India’s performance in the Security Council from 2011–
2012 were making the body more effective and legitimate, enhancing India’s standing as 
a responsible world power, expanding the Security Council’s permanent membership, 
reforming the Security Council’s working methods, and protecting the primacy of state 
sovereignty from the United Nations sanctioned military interventions. Yet, India was 
unable to attain all of these goals in its last term. The authors raise the challenges faced 
by India in attaining these ambitions, which consisted of insufficient Indian government 
resources devoted to multilateral diplomacy, insufficient engagement with the normative 
features of many Security Council issues, and constant calls of entitlement to permanent 
membership47.  Despite the outcome of India’s most recent Security Council term, there 
is widespread consensus among India’s elites that a permanent seat on the Security 
Council is only a matter of time.  
 While India was unsuccessful in expanding the Security Council’s permanent 
membership during its seventh term, it is still eager to reform the council. M J Akbar 
stated, “The Security Council will not be changed from inside, but from outside.48” This 
is precisely what India has been doing through soft power for the past two decades in 
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regards to lobbying and convincing other countries to support its candidature as a 
permanent seat member in the body. Srinath Raghavan asserts that India desires “to make 
its presence in the UNSC felt as an independent power, that is, a power that would not 
automatically follow the lead of the P-5 but would judge issues on their merits”49. India is 
a country that is not swayed by other Member States’ viewpoints, but rather advocates for 
its opinions. For years to come, India will continue to be adamant in its goals towards the 
Security Council until tangible progress has been made that reflects the realities of the 
world.  
WHY DOES INDIA NOW WANT TO HAVE A PERMANENT SEAT?  
 
 There is an abundance of reasons behind India’s quest for permanent membership 
in the Security Council. Many political observers believe that it deserves this position 
based on India’s physical presence, identification as the tenth largest economy in the 
world and third largest army, and having served in the Security Council for fourteen 
years. Additionally, India is a member of the G-4 and G-77, the world’s largest 
democracy, and the third largest contributor of peacekeeping troops for UN efforts. 
Ultimately, India has proven itself to be a cooperative country on the international level. 
Relevant standards such as gross domestic product, population size, and large 
contributions to the United Nations would qualify India as a permanent member of the 
council. Former Indian foreign minister I.K. Gujral stated, “True 
multilateralism…requires the full and equal participation of all nations – big and small – 
in the multilateral decision-making process…The voice of the majority must not only be 	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heard but also be respected”50.  For the past two decades, India has been campaigning for 
a permanent seat on the Security Council with greater fervor with each passing year.  
Before the 2005 United Nations Summit, India united with Brazil, Germany, and 
Japan as the G-4 countries in the hopes to gain a permanent seat each in the council. 
While discussion on Security Council reform did not result favorably for the four 
countries due to dispute of greater African representation, it magnified the role of each 
country at the international level. In fact, Mukherjee and Malone assert that Brazil, South 
Africa, and India started to have a larger international role, such as in the Group of 20, 
which is focused on economic issues. In Rajesh Rajagopalan and Atul Mishra’s Nuclear 
South Asia: Keywords and Concepts, the authors assert, “there is little doubt that India 
has always desired a greater role in world affairs; its long quest for a seat in the United 
Nations Security Council is one indication”51. They further this point by highlighting 
India’s accelerated pursuit of nuclear weapons in the 1960s as compensation for its 
minimal status in international affairs after its defeat in the 1962 War with China.  
 The issue of whether India has been successful in expanding permanent and non-
permanent seats in the Security Council is multifaceted. Some critics argue that India’s 
goal of gaining a Permanent Seat is beyond reach. However, for many pundits, India is 
the top and most viable candidate for permanent membership in the council. Ramesh 
Thakur, Director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament at the 
Australian National University, stated, “If there was to be a vote on a new UNSC, (there 	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is) no question but that India would get through, I suspect with the largest majority of all 
candidate countries”52. Based on a 2012 survey of UN experts, India leads other 
candidates in potential permanent membership.  Therefore, India’s awareness for its bid 
to join the Security Council as a permanent seat member has not gone unnoticed.  
UN General Assembly President Sam Kutesa circulated a text among Member 
States as the basis for negotiations on the reform of the Security Council in 2015. India is 
pleased that the adoption of the text on reforms occurred at the 70th session of the United 
Nations General Assembly, calling it path-breaking and historic. It believes that this 
decision to move forward pushes the Intergovernmental Process to follow an irreversible 
text-based negotiations path that will affect the dynamics of the negotiations on attaining 
Security Council reforms. For India, the need for reform of the Security Council “cannot 
be seen to be an exercise ad infinitum and a results-based timeline is crucial”53. Because 
permanent membership and expanding seats in the Security Council are important to 
India’s foreign policy and status in the international arena, it will continue to work 
towards this concrete outcome.  
It should also be noted that countries such as Pakistan and Argentina have raised 
concerns about India and Brazil’s bid for permanent membership. To many political 
observers, Pakistan is irrevocably opposed to India’s quest to be a permanent member 
because of strategic rivalry on the subcontinent. In a similar fashion, many scholars feel 
that “Brazil occupies a place analogous to India’s…pointing to Portuguese-speaking 	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Brazil’s inferior credential in representing largely Hispanic Latin America”54. Argentina 
has made it clear that it does not support Brazil’s aim to be a permanent member. This 
parallel highlights the number of obstacles India and Brazil, as leading contenders for 
permanent membership to the Security Council, face in their quest. Essentially, these 
obstacles have not paralyzed India’s drive to obtain permanent membership, but rather, is 
motivated to secure the support of the international community.  
THE ARGUMENT OF SOFT POWER  
 
While Joseph S. Nye, Jr.’s definition of soft power aptly describes how states can 
interact with one another on an international level without using force, it does not take 
into consideration the magnitude of shaping norms. Nye explains that soft power can 
derive from cultural, political values, and foreign policies. However, he highlights the 
limits of soft power by stating, “it tends to have diffuse effects on the outside world and 
is not easily wielded to achieve specific outcomes”55. Yet, Nye’s reasoning of soft power 
falls short in that it does not account for the long-term effects of countries’ steadfast 
principles shaping other countries’ perspectives on the same issues. In the case of India, 
soft power is utilized to persuade other countries of its aspiration to be a permanent 
member of the Security Council, as well as why it can serve the objectives for which the 
Security Council was established. Moreover, India strives to attain a specific outcome, 
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make its imprint in the Security Council to enhance its cooperation on an international 
level, as well as be an active player in this forum. Essentially, India’s push for acceptance 
in the Security Council as a permanent member is one form of soft power in its ability to 
influence or change other countries’ long-standing positions and preferences. 
The Indian Ministry of External Affairs is currently pushing for an overhaul of 
reform in the Security Council membership composition. It urges the United Nations 
Security Council to reflect modern day global realities. For India, the only way for this to 
occur is through the expansion of the Security Council in both the permanent and non-
permanent categories. The ultimate goal will be executed through soft power as the 
Ministry of External Affairs writes, “The Government of India has been actively working 
along with other like-minded countries for building support among the UN membership 
for a meaningful restructuring and expansion of the UNSC”56. In the view of the Ministry 
of External Affairs and much of the international community, the Security Council 
reflects the immediate geopolitical architecture of post-World War II. India has attempted 
to persuade other countries of this urgent need to reform the Security Council by 
highlighting how the number of Member Nations in the United Nations has increased 
from 113 to 193 without any drastic change to the composition of the council.  
In Shimla Rashtrapati Niwas’s The Many Forms of Soft Power: India and the 
World, she asks these question: “Is there a middle path in terms of India’s political 
commitments globally?” and “what are India’s political values that are pre-eminent in 
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their scheme of things?57” For India, being a “norm shaper”, through soft power, is 
convincing the participating governments of the General Assembly to accept its request 
of permanent membership, as well as recognize the efforts the country has taken to 
promote international cooperation. Because India has continuously made efforts to show 
the United Nations that it longs to be a cooperative player, other representatives of the 
organization have taken heed to consider India as a permanent member of the council. 
India agrees to the principles of the United Nations Security Council and pledges to 
uphold the United Nations Charter. However, it firmly believes that the Security Council 
needs to adjust its norms and be inclusive of the other Member States in terms of 
representation. Over two decades, India has been successful in gaining other countries’ 
support of reform and views itself as a leader for attaining these much needed changes to 
the Security Council.  
India has leverage in this issue of Security Council reforms, as it is strategic in 
how it goes about campaigning for its bid of permanent membership in the body. In Erik 
Voeten’s “Why No UN Security Council Reform?: Lessons for and from Institutionalist 
Theory”, he writes: “Although the permanent five are powerful, other states have 
considerable potential leverage. Japan and Germany could cease paying the UN’s bill; 
India, Brazil, and South Africa could co-opt developing nations to ignore UNSC 
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decisions58”. The United Nations is a logical platform in which India sees itself as a 
responsible stakeholder in a multilaterally structured and democratically governed body. 
It is not just the permanent five members’ voices that are being heard in the United 
Nations on various issues. Currently, India also has policymakers that are more pragmatic 
than previous ones as their negotiation style does not depend on the moral weight of its 
arguments, but rather a disposition of political calculus. Through multilateral diplomacy 
and striking endorsements from countries in their quest for a permanent seat on the 
Security Council, India rises in its international profile. Instead, rising powers such as 
India are exerting their influence in the international arena, cooperating with other 
countries to bring about reforms, and leading other countries to rethink their norms.   
WHAT DOES SOFT POWER MEAN FOR INDIA? 
 
 Since being recognized as one of the founding countries of the United Nations, 
India has worked to advance the core principles of the United Nations Charter. For 
Narendra Patil of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, securing a permanent 
seat on the Security Council would be monumental for India as it would be an 
acknowledgment of the vital leadership India has put forth in the non-aligned movement, 
as well as representative of the developing world59. Foreign policy analyst Raja Mohan 
asserts that India holds “strong cards in the arena of soft power” to advance its foreign 
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policy goals60. At the same time, many countries have and continue to look upon India 
for its perspective and advice on issues. In a letter, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit wrote to 
Nehru, “The Middle East countries and Russia, as well as the American friends of India 
look to India and to you to assume the leadership of Asia…We have been misrepresented 
far too long and the ‘big five’ are neither big enough nor united enough to lead the 
world”61. Therefore, soft power has not just been a part of India’s foreign policy in the 
21st century; it has also been evident in India’s foreign policy from the inception of the 
Security Council and well into the non-alignment period.   
 In a panel interview at Brookings Institution held on November 13, 2015, leading 
India experts Tanvi Madan, David M. Malone, Rani Mullen, and Stephen P. Cohen 
discussed India’s foreign policy, ideas, institutions, and practice. Rani Mullen explained 
that India’s soft power is not determined by its hard power. Instead, Mullen stated that 
India’s foreign policies, power to entice, to influence, and attract other countries are what 
defines India’s ability to engage with other countries. For example, she recalls India’s 
ability to utilize its soft power strategically evidenced by the recent third India-Africa 
forum, which India hosted 40 African leaders. She states, “If Indian soft power and its 
power to attract is effective, it should open other countries to Indian viewpoints”62. Many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60  Sundha Ramachandran, “India’s Soft Power Potential”, The Diplomat, May 29, 2015, 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/indias-soft-power-potential/ 
61 Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit to Jawaharlal Nehru, 30 June1945, in Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit Papers, 
Correspondence, pg. 321, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi (NMML). 
 
62 “Indian Foreign Policy: Ideas, Institutions & Practice”, The Brookings Institution, November 
13, 2015, Moderator: Bruce Jones (Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy, The Brookings 
Institution), Panelists: Tanvi Madan (Fellow and Director, The India Project, The Brookings 
Institution), David M. Malone (Rector, United Nations University, Under-Secretary General, 
United Nations), Rani Mullen (Associate Professor, Government, College of William & Mary), 
	  	  
36 
	  
countries have seen India countless times speak on the unfair distribution of power in 
major institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the Security 
Council. India has established itself as a leader pushing for Security Council reforms and 
much of the international community has taken notice of its efforts. 
 Soft power is a salient element in India’s foreign policy in regards to leverage and 
influence on other countries. Mullen asserts that India’s strategy is gaining momentum as 
evidenced by the growing trade deals, negotiations, and education programs. 
Additionally, she examines how there are memorandums of understandings signed 
between African countries and India pushing the issue of India not having a permanent 
Security Council seat. When asked a question about India on the global stage, its 
evolution in the United Nations, and if UN matters to Indian foreign policy, Malone 
stated, “I think it matters symbolically. And Indians are very good at working the UN 
system…And so I think the seat does matter to them…Would it prefer to be a permanent 
member, but a second-class one, or would it prefer not to be a permanent member? That’s 
something Delhi will have to think about when the time comes. But I think it’s an 
accomplished multilateral actor”63. Mullen’s assertion of India being an accomplished 
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multilateral actor stems from its ability to engage with other countries diplomatically and 
gain their trust and support in dialogue at the global level.   
THE EFFECTS OF INDIA’S SOFT POWER  
 
Although the road may be long and a successful outcome may not come to 
fruition, India has wielded international influence by convincing and collaborating with 
countries such as permanent Security Council members, United States, France, Russia, 
and the United Kingdom, as well as an increasing list of other countries to pledge support 
of its application. In fact, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs emphasizes how “India 
is also pursuing the matter through bilateral channels with [their] interlocutors. A large 
number of countries have supported India’s initiatives for reform of the UNSC as well as 
endorsed its candidature for permanent membership64.” US Representative to the United 
Nations, Samantha Power, weighed in on the issue of reforming the Security Council in 
September 2015 with “Let me affirm that we support a reformed UN Security Council 
that includes India as a permanent member”65. This joint statement resulted from the 
Indian-US Strategic and Commercial Dialogue, as well as the text that circulated in the 
General Assembly on the major reforms of the Security Council prior to the dialogue. 
Moreover, India and the United States are both dedicated to Security Council reform 
evidenced by their participation in the UN Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on 
Security Council Reform. In September 2015, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Gennady Gatilov met with Indian Ministry of External Affairs Sujata Mehta to discuss 	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the 70th anniversary session of the UN General Assembly; it was at this meeting that an 
assurance was made by the Russian Federation of India’s efforts in gaining a permanent 
Security Council seat. The Russian Embassy released a statement soon after the meeting, 
“The Russian side reaffirmed the readiness to support the Indian candidature for the 
United Nations Security Council permanent membership in case of decision to extend it 
both categories – permanent and non-permanent members 66 ”. As for the United 
Kingdom, Prime Minister David Cameron is behind a renewed, modern partnership 
between the two countries and stated in November 2015, “UK backs India for a 
permanent seat at the UN Security Council”67.  This joint statement was released after 
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the United Kingdom, which also led to a 
civilian nuclear deal between the two countries worth 9 billion pounds. The Permanent 
Representative of France to the United Nations, Francois Delattre, has also supported 
India’s representation in the Security Council stating in 2015, “France supports an 
enlargement of the Council in both categories of membership, permanent and non-
permanent and supports Germany, Japan, which deserves to be mentioned today, but also 
India, Brazil, and African representation68”. Moreover, India’s capacity to have four out 
of the five permanent Security Council members endorse its candidature for a permanent 
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seat in the body is not only both monumental and groundbreaking, but speaks of India’s 
significant soft power.  
 In September 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi chaired the Special 
Summit of G-4 nations on the agenda of major Security Council Reforms in New York. 
Modi has repeatedly argued that countries exist in a fundamentally different world from 
the time the United Nations was created. On September 14, 2015, the United Nations 
General Assembly adopted Decision 69/560, which served as the basis for negotiation 
within the IGN towards text-based negotiations on UN reforms. This is considered to be a 
historical moment because the text for these major reforms took 23 years to reach 
completion. While the foreign ministers of each G-4 country met in 2013 and 2014 to 
discuss Security Council reforms, the heads of the countries met in September 2015 for 
the first time in a decade. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, President of Brazil, 
Dilma Rousseff, Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, and Prime Minister of Japan, 
Shinzo Abe stressed the need for a more representative, legitimate Security Council for 
the future of global security69. The leaders of the United States, United Kingdom, and 
France reaffirmed their support of India’s permanent membership to the Council after 
each one met with Modi. India’s External Affairs Ministry spokesman Vikas Swarup 
raised a point after the Summit that President Obama’s reiterated support for India’s 
quest for permanent membership is significant and that India is looking forward to how 
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the Intergovernmental Negotiations advance70. Japan, Germany, Brazil, and India are a 
force in international politics as evidenced by their efforts to be taken as serious 
candidates for permanent Security Council membership. Taking leadership in the 
movement of Security Council reforms, Modi chaired the G-4 Summit to reinvigorate 
their resolve to fulfill the principles of the UN Charter and advocated better 
representation at the international institutional level.  
Additionally, India has put forth it bid for a 2021–2022 non-permanent seat as 
expressed by the Permanent Representative to the UN Asoke Kumar Mukerji. This is a 
unique diplomatic move by India. India put forth its candidature after Afghanistan 
withdrew its bid for a non-permanent seat during this term. This action by Afghanistan 
was a result of bilateral discussion between the two countries. The Permanent Mission of 
Afghanistan wrote in a letter, “The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
has decided to withdraw its candidacy…This decision is taken on the basis of the long-
standing, close and friendly relations between the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan and the Republic of India.71” From this interaction, political observers can 
assume that India still longs to take a bigger role in international politics and has the 
ability to shape other countries’ decisions. Historically, India and Afghanistan have had a 
complex relationship, but Afghanistan’s decision to support India’s bid for a non-
permanent seat in the 2021–2022 Security Council term emphasizes India’s ability to 
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collaborate diplomatically. India, among the other G-4 countries, has continued to show 
that it has the capacity and willingness to fulfill key responsibilities for the preservation 
of international peace and stability.  
In terms of the future, India has revealed its soft power through its pledge to be 
flexible with detailed proposals on Security Council reforms. For example, India has 
shown room to compromise in regards to the right of veto as it may be willing to 
negotiate further on this matter. At this moment, India weighs the option of becoming a 
permanent member on the Security Council as an anticipated responsibility that is time-
sensitive. Moreover, it believes that a straw poll should be taken to determine what 
hesitations and concerns countries may have in regards to reforms of the Council. India 
has taken extra efforts to signal to other Member States that it is in favor of cooperation 
and genuine reform of the Security Council. Permanent Representative of India to the 
United Nations, Nirupam Sen, asserts that there is no added value in a resolution for 
Security Council reform if it avoids the acceptance of new permanent seats. It is also 
widely believed among Indian officials and diplomats that India will continue to 
“staunchly believe that time is on their side and that they can afford to wait the process 
out in hope of a permanent seat”72. India’s vigor in seeking permanent membership of the 
Security Council has not wavered and rather, looks to increase in the future.  
TIMELINE OF SECURITY COUNCIL REFORMS 
  
On December 11, 1992, Security Council reforms were officially added to the 
General Assembly’s agenda at the 48th Session, specifically on the question of equitable 	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representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council. Among those 
who advocated these reforms were India and 34 other countries from the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Additionally, Member States were given the task to submit comments on a 
potential review of membership of the Security Council with the deadline of June 1993. 
In 1993, the Open-Ended Working Group was created to record the progress of its efforts 
before the General Assembly. Some of the issues that the group discussed were veto 
restraints and improvements, as well as a category of elected seats with a longer term. In 
2000, deliberations on Security Council reforms intensified as seen in the final document 
produced at the Millennium Summit. At the 2005 World Summit, the G-4 Countries, 
India, Germany, Brazil, and Japan advocated for permanent seats with veto power on the 
condition of a review taking place. The Group of Four supports a new permanent 
Security Council seat for each of its members as well as two seats for Africa. Between 
2006 and 2007, alternative models were discussed and at one point, Brazil, Germany, and 
Japan showed interest for longer-term seats. However, India was firm in its stance that it 
did not agree to longer-term seats and placing the discussion of permanent seats on hold. 
The G4’s official statement for a possible solution on expansion of the Security Council 
and veto power is:  
Membership of the Security Council shall be enlarged in both categories, 
new permanent members and new non-permanent members. Member 
States should continue discussion on the use of the veto in certain 
circumstances and, in this context, the following voluntary offer is made. 
New permanent members would as a principle have the same 
responsibilities and obligations as current permanent members. However, 
new permanent members shall not exercise the veto-right until a decision 
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on the matter has been taken during a review, to be held 15 years after the 
coming into force of the reform73.  
From this statement, political observers can see India’s flexibility on the use of veto 
power for the future permanent seat members. India agreed with Brazil, Japan, and 
Germany that the use of veto power would be reviewed 15 years after the new permanent 
seats were added to the Security Council. Therefore, while India is particular on gaining a 
permanent seat in the Security Council, it is strategic and rational in its campaign for 
reform.  
BLOCS ON SECURITY COUNCIL REFORMS  
 
Aside from the G-4 countries, there are several other blocs that are pushing for 
Security Council reforms with different goals. The L69 is a group of 42 Member States 
that are in support of permanent seats, extension of veto power for the permanent seats, 
and a non-permanent seat for small island states. In 2012, the L69 bloc, which includes 
India, advocated that new permanent Security Council seats should have veto power. 
There were some Member States that thought this convergence with African nations’ 
position was a move to create momentum. There is also the Pacific SIDs (Small Island 
Developing States) bloc, which is in support of L69’s proposals, but particularly for the 
call of a non-permanent seat for Small Island developing states. The C10/African Union 
group is a collaboration of 53 African countries that are in favor of two permanent seats 
for Africa with veto power. The key members of the C10 bloc are Sierra Leone, Republic 
of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Namibia, Zambia, Senegal, Kenya, Algeria, and 	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Uganda. Additionally, there is the Uniting for Consensus bloc that has 12 core members 
that are opposed to new permanent seats, but advocate an increase in non-permanent seats 
or longer-term seats. There is also the Arab Group, which supported a new permanent 
seat for Arab countries in 2013, but has not repeated this claim since. The Accounting, 
Coherence, and Transparency (ACT) bloc focuses on the working methods of the current 
Security Council and is led by countries such as Austria, Chile, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, 
Switzerland, Slovenia, and Sweden among others. Last, there is the CARICOM bloc, or 
otherwise known as the Caribbean Community, which is also aligned with the L69 bloc74. 
Although there are various blocs with different aspirations for Security Council reforms, 
they all have one thing in common: adjusting the Security Council to be more efficient, 
effective, legitimate, and representative for the good of the international community.   
Many countries that support reforms for the Security Council desire to see 
concrete results after several years of negotiations. From 2007 onwards, many member 
states turned to Intergovernmental Negotiations to push for concrete efforts, particularly 
India, Japan, Brazil, and Germany. From 2016 to 2017, Japan will serve as a non-
permanent member of the Security Council after feeling uncertain that it would not attain 
a permanent seat in 2015. Yet, India is still adamant on becoming a permanent member 
of the Security Council and poses as a strong candidate for an expanded body. India will 
remain an ardent protester of the Security Council’s status quo until satisfactory reforms 
have been achieved to its liking.   
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INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS ON SECURITY COUNCIL 
REFORMS 
 
The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Negotiations have been under way since 
September 15, 2008 in discussing Security Council reforms as a result of the General 
Assembly’s decision 62/557. The five issues that the intergovernmental negotiations 
focus on are the categories of membership, veto power, regional representation, size and 
functioning of the Security Council, and relationship between the General Assembly and 
Security Council. The General Assembly ruled that reform would depend on the widest 
possible political acceptance as seen in resolution 62/557, and not strictly by consensus. 
Jamaican Ambassador Courtenay Rattray, the chief of the negotiating team, has been 
praised for his efforts in moving the reform process substantially forward. It is important 
to note that Jamaica is a member of the L69 group and has been vocal in supporting 
Security Council reforms. From the negotiations, a text was created to debate and 
converge on reforms. However, countries such as the Russian Federation and China do 
not consider the text produced by the intergovernmental negotiations as the foundation 
for discussion on reforms. Rather in 2013, the Russian Federation and China claimed that 
timing of the text-based negotiations was not yet right. Moreover, they expressed that the 
that while there is widespread support for reforming the Security Council among Member 
States, there still is a lack of consensus on which reforms should take place. The Indian 
delegation has countered this point by asserting that timing is a key factor in these 
negotiations.   
When asked about the timeline of progress, India’s Permanent Representative to 
the United Nations Asoke Mukerji stated that it depends, particularly if the United 
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Nations General Assembly President Mogens Lykketoft retains Ambassador Rattray as 
the head of the negotiating team75. On October 23, 2015, it was announced that the 
Permanent Representative of Luxembourg Ambassador Sylvie Lucas would be the next 
head of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reforms76. Minister of 
Foreign and European Affairs of Luxembourg, Jean Asselborn, stated that Ambassador 
Lucas would work conscientiously to converge the Member Sates to collaborate on a 
more representative, transparent, and effective council to handle peace and international 
security issues of the 21st century.  
In February 2015, the Foreign Ministers of China and Russia released a 
communiqué that reiterated “the importance they attached to the status of India in 
international affairs and supported its aspiration to play a greater role in the United 
Nations”77. Both countries’ leaders are looking for the broadest consensus among the 
United Nations General Assembly on United Nations Security Council reforms through 
diplomatic means. Currently, the Russian Federation, once opposed to expanding 
permanent Security Council seats, is now considering “any reasonable option of 
expanding the Security Council including the so-called ‘intermediate solution’, which 
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eludes to a compromise”78. The United States has outlined that the election of any 
additional permanent members should be country-specific in nature rather than 
regionally-specific, emphasizing the maintenance of international peace and security, and 
overall, supports a modest expansion of permanent members.  
The five categories that the Intergovernmental Negotiations are focused on 
exemplify the root of many countries’ frustration with the Security Council. While the 
issues of expansion in permanent Security Council seats and extension of the veto power 
are problematic, the G-4 countries, first and foremost, continue to demand recognition as 
permanent members on the body. On the issue of veto power, there has been discussion 
of only utilizing this power for “responsibility to protect” situations such as genocides. In 
regards to regional representation, potential Security Council reforms include the 
expansion of seats to African and Arab countries, small islands, and Eastern European 
countries. Yet, this proposal of expansion based on a rotational basis or permanency has 
faced opposition from a number of countries. As for the expansion of the body, 
increasing the number of members may not correlate with a decrease in efficiency. Also, 
an enlarged Security Council could lead to creative, multi-faceted solutions. Moreover, a 
larger Security Council could place pressure on permanent members with veto power 
when casting their votes. With more member states, permanent members with veto power 
may vote differently or think more strategically due to the increased representation of the 
body. In the last category, a number of countries have pledged support behind the 
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recommendation of having more consistent, analytical annual reports as well as special 
reports from the Security Council to the General Assembly79.  
Now that the negotiations text is being circulated throughout the United Nations 
General Assembly, permanent members of the Security Council cannot veto or stop the 
Intergovernmental Negotiations process. Therefore, even if countries oppose Security 
Council reforms, the process will continue to progress where aspirant countries need a 
two-thirds majority from the United Nations General Assembly on the proposals. In the 
history of the Intergovernmental Negotiation process, this is the first time that a decision 
on Security Council reform has been adopted by consensus through an official formal L 
Document of the United Nations General Assembly. This is also a victory for India 
because the text-based negotiations are one step closer in adopting potential reforms.  For 
seven years, countries were making statements about reforms, but the text offers a 
tangible platform in which Member States can engage in productive discussion about the 
proposals.  
INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES’ PARTNERSHIP 
 
 In a 1953 interview with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, the Leader of the 
United States Delegation to the United Nations, Ms. Pandit recalls how President 
Eisenhower “deeply desired friendship with India…He was conscious of the fact that the 
key to be used not through any pressure of events or any compulsion but because the 
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great Indian nation realised its responsibility to all freedom-loving peoples80”. When 
nations such as the United States or Soviet Union courted India in the 1950s with offers 
for a permanent seat at the Security Council, India cited international security and timing 
to be the factors for its refusal. However, India was aware of its position in the 
international arena and responsibility for preserving peace, similar to how the country 
views itself as a leader today, but now deserving a permanent seat in the Security 
Council.  
President Barack Obama’s endorsement of India’s bid for a permanent Security 
Council seat in November 2010 was historic. While visiting India, President Obama 
addressed dignitaries, “As two global leaders, the United States and India can partner for 
global security…And that is why I can say today, in the years ahead, I look forward to a 
reformed United Nations Security Council that includes India as a permanent member81”. 
It signaled to the international community that the world’s largest democracies were 
fostering an indispensable partnership. The United States also supports reforms that will 
lead to a United Nations Security Council that is efficient, effective, credible and 
legitimate. In a speech to the Indian Parliament, President Obama stated, “In Asia and 
around the world, India is not simply emerging. India has emerged82.” Though the 
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endorsement may be a symbolic one, countries such as China and the remaining 
Permanent Members have taken notice of India’s posture in the international community.  
The significance of President Obama’s message should not be taken lightly. Ben 
Rhodes, one of President Obama’s top foreign policy advisers, stated that the 
endorsement was made to send a powerful message in regard to India’s performance on 
the world stage. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry was shocked at the United States’ statement 
and stated that it would hope that the country “take a moral view and not base itself on 
any temporary expediency or exigencies of power politics83”. Nonetheless, after President 
Obama’s statement, Indian officials were ecstatic to hear the United States’ call for India 
to lead, not as an opportunity, but as a responsibility. Some pundits have declared the 
United States’ political statement as bold because it is the recognition of India’s 
movement towards global power, as well as the United States’ efforts to be a partner of 
India.  
 Both the United States and India can benefit from a partnership. Tanvi Madan 
from the Brookings Institution panel interview stated, “There’s nothing like a rising 
India, a democratic India, that will show through the power of example that democracies 
can succeed as well. And I think that’s been kind of a key element…saying that the U.S. 
is a principle partner in India’s rise. That they’ve acknowledged that role, there will be a 
key role in terms of helping”84. For a permanent member of the Security Council like the 
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United States to recognize India as a desired future permanent member offers credibility 
to the latter’s aspiration. India portrays itself as a country that is willing to go great 
lengths to fortify the legitimacy of the Security Council. Moreover, now that India has 
secured the United States’ support for its bid, other Member States will be bound to think 
of India as a serious contender, rethink their norms of Security Council reforms, and view 
India as a potential permanent member of the Security Council.   
LOBBYING EFFORTS  
  
The expansion of the Security Council is contentious for a number of reasons. To 
date, there have been relatively few concrete efforts to reform the body that have been 
successful. Additionally, many pundits question the Security Council’s legitimacy and if 
it reflects 21st century realities. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan asked, 
“The need for Security Council reform is not questioned…It needs new members and 
more of them, but how many, and which ones?85” Some countries feel that an expansion 
to the Security Council could lead to the dilution of the body’s powers or impede its 
decision-making. However, there are an overwhelming number of countries that feel that 
increased representation in the body would result in greater legitimacy of the resolutions. 
One thing that is certain is that there has been a lack of consensus over which countries 
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would be included in these reforms or which alternative model should ultimately be 
adhered to.  
Many point to the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of a 
consensus resolution for the Intergovernmental Negotiations Group as notable. At the 
70th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the basis of a negotiating text was 
adopted by consensus and not by a vote. For the past seven years of Intergovernmental 
Negotiations, leaders have conducted discussion and debate without a text. UN General 
Assembly President Sam Kutesa circulated the texts to all Member States, which 
included key positions and proposals. This 25-page document consists of the views from 
various groups of countries such as the G-4, L69, and other regional blocs. However, the 
Uniting for Consensus group, led by Italy, Pakistan, and South Korea were vocal in their 
opposition towards the text-based negotiations. Despite their lack of support for the text, 
the text was passed by consensus, which India advocated strongly for years. India’s 
Ambassador to the UN Asoke Kumar Mukerji stated, “Those who ask for not imposing 
artificial timelines may be advised to desist from inflicting artificial delays on this 
process”86. India has asserted that a results-based timeline is imperative in attaining 
Security Council reforms rather than an exercise ad infinitum, which is why it strongly 
urged other countries to participate in the text-based negotiations document.  
Since formally launching its campaign to gain a permanent Security Council seat 
in 1992, a rising number of countries have pledged their support in India’s bid. With 
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great power comes great responsibility; a permanent seat in the Security Council with 
veto power certainly demands thoughtful and responsible leadership. In 2005, India 
asserted that a permanent seat on the council should also include veto power. The Indian 
Ambassador to the UN, Nirupam stated at the general Assembly on the High Level Panel 
Report: “A new category of permanent members without veto would not balance the 
weight of existing permanent members. That is precisely why new permanent members 
should have the veto under guidelines that would act as an example to other permanent 
members”87. In 2005, a BBC World Service Poll with the help of international polling 
firm GlobeScan was conducted across 23 countries with over 23,000 respondents on the 
issue of Security Council reforms. A majority of countries, 22 out of the 23, were in favor 
of increasing permanent Security Council seats, most notably to India, Germany, Japan, 
and Brazil. Steven Kull, director of Program on International Policy Attitudes at the 
University of Maryland, who helped conduct this poll stated, “Very large majorities all 
around the world are calling for the UN to become more powerful in world affairs. 
Consistent with this sentiment there is broad support for making the UN Security Council 
more representative by adding new members…The readiness for dramatic change is very 
palpable”88. On behalf of the United Kingdom, Philip Parham expressed at the General 
Assembly in 2010, “on the Council’s structure, we continue to support permanent 
membership for Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, as well as permanent representation 
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for Africa”89. Additionally, a rising number of developing countries have pledged their 
support of India’s candidature for a permanent Security Council seat at the General 
Assembly meeting.  Thus, India will continue to earnestly canvass for a permanent seat in 
the body until tangible reforms are attained.   
When it comes to seeking a permanent Security Council seat, India’s use of soft 
power in lobbying for its bid characterizes its negotiating style multilaterally. Many 
pundits assert that Indian negotiators have a tendency to over negotiate or do not know 
when to proclaim a win. David M. Malone argues that India needs to be more strategic 
about what it wants. He elaborates on this point by highlighting India’s need to 
compromise in small ways, which does not come naturally to many of its negotiators90. 
However, to gain wider support for its bid of a permanent seat in the Council, India has 
shifted away from its insistence on retaining the veto power and has campaigned more on 
the issues of expansion of permanent Security Council seats and non-permanent seats. 
According to the Defence Forum India, 84 countries have supported India in its bid for 
permanent membership in the Security Council91. For each country that has reinforced 
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India’s candidature for a permanent seat there are several news articles and memos from 
the Indian government expressing their support. As a result, India is pushing its 
diplomacy, collaboration, and leadership on the international level through public 
endorsements. Furthermore, India has been sending emissaries to different countries such 
as the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russian Federation, China, and the 
African Union to rally support for its bid. From these two strategies of sending emissaries 
and publically promoting its endorsements, India has been wholly successful in gaining 
support for its bid of a permanent seat in the body.  
SOFT POWER AND NEGOTIATION 
  
The issue of permanent membership and reforms in the Security Council for India 
is one that cannot be closely compared to other multilateral organizations such as the 
International Monetary Fund or World Bank. India’s soft power through foreign policy at 
the Security Council emphasizes the “long game”. India is committed to its campaign of 
permanent membership and greater representation in the Security Council as evidenced 
by its willingness to promote its aspirations for over twenty years. There is no alternative 
body or institutional forum to the United Nations, whereas with the International 
Monetary Fund or World Bank, India can turn to, join, or form a number of bodies for 
similar purposes such as the BRICs bank. However, the United Nations is an important 
multilateral organization that has principles, which India strongly adheres to and hopes to 
uphold in the international community. As a founding member of the United Nations, 
India is betrothed to principles, goals of the Charter, and specialized programmes and 
agencies.  
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IMPACT IN SOUTH ASIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
However, one of India’s biggest obstacles in attaining permanent membership on 
the Security Council is China. Malone from the Brookings Institution panel argues that 
by China’s opposition of Japan’s bid for a permanent seat, it indirectly ostracizes other 
countries such as India in its candidature92. Malone believes that as long as the Security 
Council remains meaningful and relevant in the international system, India and Brazil 
will eventually attain permanent Security Council seats. Stephen Cohen mentioned in the 
Brookings Institution panel that there is a memo from the Chinese Foreign Ministry that 
argues that China should place its support behind India in Security Council and not 
Japan93. Cohen also states that China is now a South Asian power and now the two 
countries, India and China, are linked when dealing with South Asia. Therefore, 
international relations in the United Nations Security Council and South Asia point to 
India and China’s complex relationship. Where once in the 1950s India and China 
supported one another, India has now aligned itself with the United States against China 
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in the chance of gaining a permanent seat in the Security Council. Tanvi Madan echos 
these sentiments as she mentions how the soft power element is evident in both the 
United States and India’s speeches, as well as a lack of China’s name being mentioned. 
Despite China’s stance on an expanded Security Council, India will push forward in its 
aspiration to serve as a permanent member of the body.  
If India were to be appointed a permanent seat in the Security Council, there 
would be a paradigm shift felt in the international community. Some pundits argue that 
giving India a permanent seat would counterbalance China’s rising influence. Other say 
that India’s values are closely linked to the United States’ as it is the oldest democracy in 
the world. From its past efforts in the Non-Aligned movement, India has guarded its 
independence and avoided joining global blocs. These experiences could help foster 
India’s leadership if chosen to be a permanent member to the Security Council as they 
would be free from geopolitical biases that may impact other Member States. India would 
also bring to the Security Council’s table the impact of being a developing country turned 
rising power. India understands the struggles of developing countries, especially in South 
Asian and African countries, but works to create a stable, prosperous future for its people. 
With this mentality, India could serve as a well-rounded permanent member of the 
Security Council.  
PRIME MINISTER MODI AND UNSC REFORMS 
 
Prime Minister Modi has referred to the Security Council as a result of 
circumstance of a bygone era. He has continually pressed United Nations Secretary 
General Ban Ki-moon to include India in the Security Council to make the body 
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representative as well as have the reforms occur in a fixed timeframe. In a letter to the 
United Nations Security General dated July 4, 2015, Modi wrote, “It must now reflect the 
realities and needs of the 21st century. A Security Council that includes the world’s 
largest democracy, major locomotives of the global economy, and voices from all the 
major continents, will carry greater credibility and legitimacy and will be more 
representative and effective.94” It has been a top priority on Modi’s agenda to showcase 
India’s ability to serve as a responsible leader in a reformed Security Council.  
Modi, emphasizing that India is the largest contributor to the UN Peacekeeping 
forces, stated in April 2015, “India is a country that is for peace, and helps bring peace to 
the world, and yet we are fighting to get a seat in the UNSC”95. Then in October 2015 at 
the Third India-Africa Forum Summit, Modi asserted, “This is a world of free nations and 
awakened aspirations. Our institutions cannot be representative of our world, if they do 
not give voice to Africa, with more than a quarter of UN members, or the world’s largest 
democracy with one-sixth of humanity. That is why India and Africa must speak in one 
voice for reforms of the United Nations, including its Security Council96”. One of Modi’s 
strengths in leadership is not only raising awareness of India’s capabilities as a 
stakeholder in international relations, but also persuading other likeminded countries to 
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do the same. This has been especially relevant in India’s foreign policy for the past few 
decades.  
It is important for the Indian government to make sure other countries understand 
that it has contributed to the global order and desires to sustain international peace and 
security. This is most evidenced by Modi’s interest in visiting countries over the last two 
years, which have garnered wide international attention. While visiting Paris, Modi 
expressed how India has contributed and collaborated with the international community 
in WWI and WWII. In these visits, the media often publishes how and who has publicly 
supported India in their candidature for a permanent Security Council seat. Madan writes, 
“But what’s been really interesting is the number of countries he’s actually in some way 
engaged in, or somebody senior in the India government has. And if you look at every 
statement that comes out, there is always a sense that India’s pushing not just for support 
at the UN, so you see endorsements of that.97” No other country has gone to the extent 
India has to secure support from an abundance of countries in serving as permanent 
member of the Security Council.  
Since Narendra Modi was elected as Prime Minister in 2014, he has made 37 
foreign trips on five continents. He has visited Australia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Brazil, Canada, China, Fiji, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 	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Malaysia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, South Korea, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, 
France, Nepal, the Russian Federation, Singapore, and the United States. He has also 
planned to visit Belgium, Saudi Arabia, and Laos for the remainder of this year. Modi has 
underscored India’s capacity to be an international power by boosting bilateral 
relations98. Not only has this solidified India’s posture in the international arena, but also 
other countries have taken notice of India’s capabilities and leadership in global issues.  
AGENTS OF SOFT POWER 
 
 Through India’s use of soft power and shaping other country’s norms on 
reforming the Security Council, there have been changes in long-standing preferences. 
India’s agents of soft power depend on key members of India’s government such as 
Prime Minister Modi, Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj, and various 
ambassadors. In February 2015, Prime Minister Modi spoke to more than 110 Heads of 
Missions from around the globe in New Delhi about India’s leading role and adaptation 
to global changes. The focus of this conference was “Diplomacy with Development”99. 
Not only was Prime Minister Modi able to speak to Ambassadors and Heads of Missions 
about India’s efforts to promote proactive policies and areas of opportunity, but also was 
able to emphasize India’s heritage and values. Essentially, the spreading of the message 
of India’s capacity and capabilities to serve as an effective, collaborative leader in the 
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international arena is a result of India’s ambassadors, high commissioners, and key 
officials who are passionate about their country’s diplomacy. Moreover, these prominent 
leaders desire for other countries to recognize India’s potential to serve the international 
community. 
IMPACT ON THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
  
India reasons that the United Nations Security Council in its current structure is 
“completely out of tune” with global realities and serves “no one’s purpose”. The 
working methods of the Security Council do not just impact the 15 members, but also the 
193 member states of the General Assembly. Therefore, through lobbying efforts, India 
has pushed to gain traction on the issue of Security Council reform, as well as by urging 
member states to send their views on how the working methods of the council can be 
enhanced, which will be incorporated in a concept paper. When India was assigned 
Presidency of the Security Council in November 2012, it stated that the Security Council 
is “polarized and politically divided”, specifically on the issues such as Syria. It used the 
position of presidency to highlight the need for reform and an expansion to the council 
with permanent representation from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. India’s Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations, Hardeep Singh Puri said, “In order to give the 
Council effectiveness there is need to enlarge its size. India’s point of view is that the 
Security Council needs to be more transparent”100. He also emphasized that, “some 
permanent members should come off the high table but they need to bring on board other 
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countries which carry weight, participate in the Council’s work and will lend credibility 
to its images and functioning”101. From India’s perspective, over 100 countries are in 
support of Security Council reform and therefore, it is in the interest of the minority to 
listen to the global majority’s opinions.  
In February 2016, India’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations Syed 
Akbaruddin stated, “I fail to understand that if since 1945 the total population of the 
UN’s membership has increased more than 3 times, the number of countries members of 
the UN has increased more than 3 times, yet we are hearing voices saying that increase of 
the size to less than 3 times what it was in 1945 is too much”102. India has been 
promoting an urgent need to reform the Security Council for numerous years and it will 
not subside in its critiques of the current status.  
GAUGING COUNTRIES FOR INCLUSION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL  
  
There are a number of variables that India could promote for its candidature of a 
permanent Security Council seat such as being the largest democracy, second largest 
population, largest contributor of UN peacekeeping forces, third largest military, and 
tenth largest economy. But Indian elites and political officials do not lead with these 
variables when discussing their campaign in gaining a permanent seat. These objective 
standards of population, gross domestic product, and contributions to the United Nations 
peacekeeping forces do not capture a country’s aspiration to serve as a permanent 	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member of the Security Council entirely. International affairs experts Kara C. McDonald 
and Stewart M. Patrick assert that there should be a criteria-based process to gauge 
countries’ aspirations to join a potentially reformed Security Council. Their model looks 
to a number of variables such as political stability, the capacity and willingness to act in 
defense of international security, ability to negotiate and implement contentious 
agreements, and the institutional wherewithal to contribute to the UNSC agenda103. These 
indicators go beyond the measurements of economy, population, and contributions to the 
United Nations. With these other factors, India propels the mission of representing the 
realities of the 21st century and hope to include a larger voice on international affairs.  
PAKISTAN’S STANCE ON INDIA AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
Politics does not occur in a power vacuum. Pakistan strongly opposes India’s 
movement towards permanent Security Council seat expansion. Pakistan’s Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations, Maleeha Lodhi, states that adding permanent 
members is a sterile move as they would not be accountable to those they are supposed to 
represent104. Although Lodhi did not explicitly state India when speaking, she asserted 
that there are a number of countries who seek to “promote their self-arrogated right to a 
privileged and unequal status. And they have maintained this rigid position since the 
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process began about two decades ago”105. She goes on to say that it is due to these 
countries’ rigidity and blind pursuit of national ambition that Security Council reforms 
have not been accomplished. However, Lodhi did comment to Pakistani media that the 
United Nations is declining in moral legitimacy and this could be reversed if the Security 
Council took into account the collective voice of the General Assembly.  
Pakistan is a member of the Uniting for Consensus group, which supports the 
expansion of non- permanent seats or a new category of longer-term seats and is opposed 
to adding any permanent seats. The Uniting for Consensus group has a core membership 
of about twelve countries such as Italy, Argentina, Canada, Mexico, Republic of Korea, 
Spain and Turkey. While Pakistan is against the expansion of permanent Security 
Council seats, it is in favor of a more democratic, accountable, transparent, and effective 
Security Council. In February 2015, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif spoke to President 
Barack Obama about reservations of India and its efforts to become a permanent member 
of the United Nations Security Council. A spokesman for the prime minister stated that 
India is not eligible to hold a permanent Security Council seat due to its non-compliance 
of UN resolutions regarding Kashmir. Additionally, the spokesman reiterated to President 
Obama that a permanent Security Council seat held by India would not be tolerated at 
any cost due to the contentious issue of Kashmir and self-determination for the people106.  
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Pakistan’s efforts in the Uniting for Consensus bloc have placed it at odds with 
India in this matter. India is not just a member of the Group of Four as evidenced by its 
collaboration with the L69 bloc of about 40 developing countries. Meeting often at 
India’s Mission, the L69 bloc is also the name of the draft resolution that pushed for 
Intergovernmental Negotiations and its endorsers to remain effective in reform efforts. 
The L69 bloc advocates for the extension of veto rights of permanent Security Council 
seats. Overall, as long as India works to obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council, 
Pakistan will remain opposed during the inter-governmental negotiations.   
CONSENSUS ON SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM 
  
There is momentum on Security Council reform as evidenced by the consensus 
among countries in regards to the expansion of the body from 15 members to the mid-
20s. While this has received opposition from certain countries such as the Russian 
Federation, other countries are focusing on points of convergence of reforms. India’s 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations Syed Akbaruddin stated, “By our 
account, there is more that unites us than what divides us; there is greater convergence 
than divergence”107.  For example, at the second session of the Intergovernmental 
Negotiations on Security Council Reforms (IGN), there was overwhelming support for 
increased membership, transparency, involvement of non-member countries in Security 
Council activities, and mediation over the authorization of military force. The United 
States and Russian Federation support the increase of size from 15 members to 20 
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members, highlighting that any more would lead to inefficiency of the body108. Both 
Washington and Moscow have vocally endorsed increasing permanent Security Council 
seats with India as one of the members.  
The Director Generals of United Nations Affairs and Permanent Representatives 
to the United Nations of India, Brazil, Germany, and Japan met in New Delhi on March 
4th 2016 to advance the reform agenda. In a statement expressing full support behind 
gaining concrete outcomes, the leaders reiterated “their commitments as aspiring new 
permanent members of the reformed UN Security Council, as well as their support for 
each other’s candidatures. They also reaffirmed their view of the importance of 
developing countries…to be represented in both the permanent and non-permanent 
categories of an enlarged Council”109. The next meeting will take place in June 2016 in 
Japan. Therefore, the international community will continue to see consistent efforts 
within the G-4 bloc, especially India’s dedication, to advance Security Council reforms 
from the text-based negotiations.   
IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL REFORMS 
  
The United Nations Security Council is a creature of post-World War II. Erik 
Voeten asserts that multilateral security institutions were purposively designed by the 
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winners of WWII and created barriers for potential rising powers110. Voeten recalls John 
Ikenberry’s point from After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding 
of Order after Major Wars that these institutions were planned out by the victors of 
WWII with the possible objective of locking in these favorable structures to them. Yet, 
India does not want the Security Council to continue to function as a product of post-
World War II.  
The Center for UN Reform Education states that there are no Member States that 
have vocally promoted the option of retaining the current size of the Security Council111. 
However, there are Member States that have been vocal about their reservations of 
expanding the council to the extent that it could lead to difficulty in reaching consensus 
on international issues as well as carrying out its work efficiently. The G-4 countries, 
specifically Germany and Japan, are wary that the no-expansion option may be the 
alternative if the progress on Security Council reforms stalls. However, India believes 
that the bid for permanent Security Council membership is growing in awareness and 
support, especially as its population and economy is rising in absolute numbers and 
relative to the rest of the globe. India feels that major powers on the world stage must be 
included in the representation of the Security Council for the body to remain legitimate.  
For those who support “the low twenties option”, proponents feel that expanding 
five to seven mixed number of permanent or non-permanent members would be ideal for 
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efficiency. The United States advocates this model and will not accept an expansion 
beyond the low twenties. Countries that oppose this model believe that this is a minor 
adjustment to the currently flawed Security Council. The G-4’s “mid twenties option” 
calls for the expansion of six permanent and four non-permanent members to the body. 
At the core of this model is the belief that this expansion would add to the legitimacy and 
efficiency of the council. There are only a few countries that support the “high twenties 
option”, but many Member States feel that efficiency would be sacrificed for greater 
geographical representation112.  
Article 23 of the United Nations Charter emphasizes that due regard must be 
taken when choosing non-permanent members for the Security Council in regard to 
equitable geographical distribution and contribution of UN members to the protection of 
international peace and security. There are a number of countries, particularly from 
Africa and Latin America, that believe that geographical representation must be taken 
seriously at the permanent Security Council seat level. India believes that an enlarged 
Security Council would alleviate the democratic deficit and serve for more effective 
multilateralism efforts. Yet, there are countries that are hesitant to support this idea 
because of the fear that establishing more permanent members would lead to greater 
tension in the body when it comes to decision making and less of a voice for the non-
permanent members.  
However, an enlarged Security Council would be more representative of the 21st 
century in regards to geographical representation. It would certainly allow for more 	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countries to partake in decision-making, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping on a greater 
scale. However, the expansion of the Security Council will not solely make the body 
more legitimate but also a focus on transparency and accountability, which several 
countries support. As stated by India’s Permanent Representative Asoke Kumar Mukerji, 
India is not looking to gain a permanent Security Council seat as a “badge of honour but 
as a matter that affects India deeply in areas ranging from terrorism to development”113. It 
should be noted that while there may be several implications from Security Council 
reforms, there are a wide array of benefits that could bolster the body with further 
legitimacy and effectiveness to solve issues of security.  
EFFICIENCY 
 
 Many Member States express the need to analyze the advantages and 
disadvantages of Security Council reforms, particularly in regard to the component of 
efficiency. Most Member States value the objective of hoisting the Security Council’s 
legitimacy and efficiency. However, there are many political observers who believe that 
an expansion of the Security Council could weaken decision-making and efficiency of the 
body. While there lacks a consensus on an identifiable threshold at which the body would 
become ineffective due to the number of members, there is consensus on the need for 
effectiveness. Common arguments against the expansion of the Security Council center 
on the potential inability of Member States to create effective resolutions and a lack of 
cooperation due to the diversity of interests.  
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While the aforementioned claims are valid arguments, political observers should 
not fuse the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness. Rather, effectiveness may not have 
a significant impact from an enlarged Security Council. The Working Group has 
continuously reiterated that an increase in the members of the Security Council does not 
necessarily relate or correlate to a negative result on the effectiveness or efficiency of the 
body. Proponents of an enlarged Security Council believe that a ratio must be met in the 
expansion of permanent and non-permanent members to strengthen the body’s efficiency 
and capacity for decision making. Additionally, supporters of this claim such as Pierre 
Schori of Sweden assert that an expanded Security Council would “adapt and adjust, in 
order to safeguard and strengthen its legitimacy and efficiency in global politics”114.  
The question of whether an enlarged Security Council would diminish efficiency 
is an important one. In Aris Alexopoulos and Dimitris Bourantonis’ Can Expansion Lead 
to a More Efficient UN Security Council? A Veto Players Analysis, findings reveal that 
the proposed reforms of expansion do not lead to a less efficient decision-making. The 
authors argue that the “core of such an expanded UNSC is always smaller if not the same 
with the core of the current Council, due to the fact that most of the potential new 
members belong to the middle or upper level of economic development”115. They also 
point out that international relations scholars who argue that an expanded Security 
Council would lead to less decision capacity neglect to think of the potential Member 	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States who may have preferences over policy outputs that might be convergent116. 
Therefore, when discussing efficiency and an enlarged Security Council, political 
observers must not only be aware of the number of actors in the body, but also their 
policy preferences.  
CONCLUSION  
 
Soft power is a significant aspect of India’s identity in the international 
community. India’s use of soft power has propelled the momentum of its campaign for a 
permanent Security Council seat. Moreover, it has committed itself to being a cooperative 
active member of the international community. At the beginning of India’s candidature 
for a permanent seat, there were a number of countries that opposed or did not publicly 
support its movement of Security Council reforms. However, countries such as the 
United States, United Kingdom, France, and a myriad of African countries have stood up 
recently to promote India’s responsibility to lead as a permanent Security Council 
member. Over the past two decades, an increasing number of countries have shifted from 
their original stances and advocated India’s bid with public endorsements and call for 
reforms. Not only has India taken a more active leadership role in the United Nations for 
Asian and African countries in the past seven decades, it has also shaped other countries’ 
norms of accepting India’s ability to promote international cooperation and serve as a 
potential permanent member in the Security Council.  
While attaining Security Council reforms for expansion of the body or extension 	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of permanent seats and non-permanent seats may take years before fruition, India has 
garnered widespread international recognition of its hope to serve as a permanent 
Security Council member by shaping other countries’ norms. As aptly stated by KMS 
Kodithuwakku in “Soft Power as a Tool in Indian Foreign Policy”, “In this transformed 
international system, soft power is crucial in enhancing influence over international 
outcomes because it has become more difficult to compel nations and non-state actors 
through principle levels of hard power”117. India relies on soft power to its own potential 
and capabilities, which has been significant to its identity. India will continue to pursue 
permanent membership with the policy of soft power in international dialogue until 
Security Council reforms are achieved. With India’s steadfast commitment to Security 
Council reforms, I believe that it has elevated levels of cooperation through soft power. 
As long as other countries view India as a cooperative, capable player in the United 
Nations, India’s soft power will continue to dominate its foreign policy decisions.  
In the twenty-first century, India actively pursues this cause because it believes 
that it is the appropriate time to serve as a force of stability. Additionally, an enlarged 
Security Council would increase the representation of the body and offer more Member 
States to partake in diplomacy of important global issues. As a serious contender for the 
permanent seat to the council, I believe that India’s support for more voices in the body 
has secured other countries’ encouragement in its campaign. Not only would reforms for 
expansion of permanent and non-permanent seats add to the representativeness of the 	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Security Council, but also the legitimacy of the policymaking. It will certainly be a tough 
road ahead for India to attain its desired position in the Security Council, but nonetheless, 
it will be one that is worth fighting for through diplomacy and soft power. India is 
prepared to play the crucial role of executing Security Council reforms in the interests of 
all countries, remain committed to equity, and serve the United Nations Security Council 
as a permanent member.  
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